Fidesz would have won the 6 April poll in any electoral system of the world. It would have a strong majority in the previous Hungarian system, and not taking the purely proportional systems, it would have an absolute majority in any mixed system. No democratic electoral system has been invented yet, where the so-called democratic opposition could have been a government-changing opposition with this latest accomplishment.
This must be stated so that we can see: the victory of Fidesz is unquestionable. In the meantime, we must see that the greatness of the victory is not equal with the electoral will, and that this situation is the result of Fidesz’s political planning.
If we compare the results of the election this year with 2010, we can see two important things. Fidesz received 600,000 fewer votes than four years ago and the left wing (then MSZP, now Governmental Change), after spending four years in opposition, could only raise their votes by 250,000. To what does this data draw the attention? It shows us that Fidesz has calculated well from three viewpoints:
(1) With the visibly conscious and planned (permanent) electoral campaign, Fidesz could keep the election turnout very low, and with the campaign tools it used – mostly with a well-aimed negative campaign against the opposition – could prevent voters who were disappointed with the government from voting for the opposition parties.
(2) With the new electoral system, the party ensured that it would obtain the two-thirds in Parliament, even in case of a major loss of votes. Fidesz also achieved that the opposition would only get hold of one-third of the mandates, even if it received more votes together. It does not matter that LMP, Jobbik and the left wing received more than 50%, they could only secure 10 of the 106 individual election districts.
(3) The new system meant Fidesz forced the left-wing opposition to unite. Without this move, they would not have had a chance to win in any of the election districts. With this joined campaign, Fidesz also secured that the so-called Gyurcsány coalition could not have the impression of renascence. This way, it was incapable of winning new voters, who voted against them in 2010.
The political calculation therefore proved to work without mistakes. With the relative majority of Fidesz voters, it could still perform the same as in 2010. Naturally, we could say that the party could only achieve this with political engineering and the one-sided reformation of the electoral system. Yes, Fidesz needed this too, just as much as the very conscious and disciplined communication that it used.
Of course we can have aesthetic objections to this but the reformation of institutes (if there is a necessary majority) and the simplified political discourse have always been applied tools of democratic politics. Fidesz used the opportunities that were in reach, set its own trap, and the opposition could neither avoid walking in it, nor could it achieve that the voters would turn away from Fidesz because of it setting a trap.